A Monte Carlo examination of bias tests in mortgage lending by Paul W. Bauer & Brian A. Cromwell
A Monte Carlo Examination of Bias
Tests in Mortgage Lending
by Paul W. Bauer and Brian A. Cromwell Paul W. Bauer is an economist at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land, and Brian A. Cromwell is a
manager at Deloitte & Touche,
Washington, D.C. The authors
thank Robert Avery, Patricia
Beeson, Paul Calem, Fred Furlong,
Arden Hall, Gordon Smith, Mark
Sniderman, and David Vandre for
useful discussions and sugges-
tions. Karen Deangelis provided ex-
cellent research assistance. The
authors also thank the Federal Re-
serve Bank of San Francisco for
supporting this research while Mr.
Cromwell was an economist there.
Introduction
For three years, data released through the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) have docu-
mented that blacks are denied loans at a much
higher rate than whites.
1 Whether this differential
reveals bias by lending institutions, however, is a
hotly debated issue. One reason is that HMDA
data do not include all of the information con-
tained on loan applications, such as the appli-
cants' job and credit histories and the size of their
down payments. Using information from loan ap-
plications, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(Munnell et al. [1992]) conducted a large statisti-
cal study of Boston-area banks (3,062 mortgage
applications). The authors found that although
the gap in denial rates between blacks and
whites narrows when the additional information
from the loan file is included, a statistically signifi-
cant differential remains. Far from settling the is-
sue, however, the Boston Fed study has merely
provided the basis for further analysis. Interest-
ingly, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
• 1 Under HMDA, lending institutions are required to record and re-
port data on applicants' race, sex, income, type of loan, loan amount, and
whether the loan was approved or denied.
(FDIC) examined the loan applications identi-
fied as most likely to have been rejected be-
cause of bias, but found no evidence of bias
and raised a number of methodological and
empirical problems with the Boston Fed study
(Home [1994]).
This Economic Review explores the effective-
ness of testing procedures in uncovering discrimi-
nation by mortgage lenders. After outlining the
regulatory issues and the inherent problems in
testing for bias, we investigate how well various
tests perform under a variety of circumstances
using simulated mortgage loan applications. We
discuss the problems involved in testing real-
world data and demonstrate how these tests per-
form using artificially generated data in which
we can control the degree of bias. It should be
emphasized that we cannot answer the question
of whether there is bias in mortgage lending, but
we have a great deal to say about the perform-
ance of bias tests when there are no measure-
ment problems with the data (a condition for
which all researchers strive) and when the de-
gree of bias is known beforehand.
We find that tests employing all of the informa-
tion included in our simulated loan files perform
much tetter than those using only the HMDA sub-
set of data. This result is not unexpected, yet theB 0 X 1
Legal Definitions of Discrimination
and Current Testing Methods
Legal Definitions
Several regulatory agencies are responsible for ensuring that
discrimination does not occur in lending institutions. Each
agency has developed a means of testing for discrimination in
the bank class it is responsible for overseeing. Three general
types of discrimination are recognized: overt discrimination,
disparate treatment, and disparate impact.
a
Overt discrimination occurs "when a lender openly dis-
criminates on a prohibited basis." In addition, overt discrimi-
nation exists even when a lender expresses, but does not act
on, a discriminatory preference. For example, a lender may
offer two equally qualified applicants of different races differ-
ent credit limits. Regulatory agencies would classify this ac-
tion as overt discrimination.
There is evidence of disparate treatment when "a lender
treats applicants differently based on prohibited factors." Dispa-
rate treatment may range from overt discrimination to subtle
differences in treatment. For example, a lender may provide a
nonminority applicant with more assistance in the application
process than it would a minority applicant.
Disparate impact occurs when a lender "applies a practice
uniformly to all applicants but the practice has a discrimina-
tory effect on a prohibited basis and is not justified by busi-
ness necessity." For example, a high-minimum-loan
requirement may prevent low-income housing applicants,
who are typically minorities, from being granted a loan.
Testing Methods
In order to test for lending discrimination, three procedures
have been developed: testing, matched pairs, and statistical
analyses. Each regulatory agency's method utilizes one or a
combination of these general procedures.
Testing is a means of measuring differences in treatment
among loan applicants. It involves sending "testers" disguised
as loan applicants into an institution where they attempt to ap-
ply for a loan. Treatment of the "applicants" is then compared
by the regulatory agency and determinations are made con-
cerning the existence of discrimination.
Matched pairs are a means of grouping minority and non-
minority applicants in a manner that will allow for accurate
comparison of treatment between groups. Matched pairs are
determined by comparing loan-to-value and debt-to-income
ratios among applicants. Matched pairs are compared in a
manner similar to that used for testers.
Statistical analyses may also be used to test for discrimina-
tion. An institution's lending data from previous years are col-
lected, entered into a statistical program, and then analyzed
for evidence of discrimination.
n. These definitions :IIV outlined in "Interagency Task Force on Fair landing,"
Federal Register, vol. V), no. 73 (April 15, 1994), p. 18268.
difficulty of detecting low levels of bias even with
large sample sizes is somewhat surprising. With
the bias parameter set to the level that results in
rejection rates similar to the actual HMDA data,
sample size is crucial. At this level of bias, tests
with sample sizes under 50 almost always fail to
detect bias, whereas econometric tests with sam-
ple sizes greater than 200 perform well. Finally,
we conduct nonparametric tests that have their
roots in the procedures employed by examiners.
Although these tests work very well in small sam-
ples, they also tend to find bias even in simula-
tions when it is not present.
I. Methods of
Testing for Bias
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits dis-
crimination with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction based on race, color, relig-
ion, national origin, sex, marital status, age
(provided the applicant has the capacity to con-
tract), receipt of income from public assistance
programs, and good-faith exercise of any rights
under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
Regulatory institutions such as the FDIC, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
the Federal Reserve Board are charged with en-
forcing this Act and uncovering discriminatory
credit approval processes (see box 1). Of the
thousands of consumer examinations con-
ducted each year, few indicate credit discrimi-
nation on the basis of race.
2 In 1992, about 90
percent of the 5,602 banking institutions in the
United States received outstanding or satisfac-
tory ratings on their consumer exams.
On the other hand, over the last three years,
large disparities between credit approval rates
of white and minority applicants have been re-
vealed by the revised HMDA data. Even con-
trolling for income, minority applicants were
rejected for credit at rates two to three times
those of white applicants. This result potentially
indicates widespread discrimination on the basis
of race. A competing explanation for this credit-
approval disparity, though, is that minority
populations are commonly found to be less
creditworthy (for example, because of lower
asset levels) than the nonminority population.
The revised HMDA data, however, do not in-
clude relevant financial information on credit
• 2 A consumer exam is conducted to ensure that the regulated finan-
cial institution is in compliance with the various statutes relating to the
treatment of consumers, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the
Community Reinvestment Act.applicants (such as assets and credit history)
that is available to decisionmaking institutions.
3
The issue of bias in mortgage lending is a
broad one, and some researchers have raised
the concern that simple comparisons of lenders'
denial rates are not sufficient for grasping the
complexities surrounding community-oriented
lending.
4 Our purpose here is to explore the
narrower issue of looking at the performance
of tests that examiners could use to detect bias
in the course of their regulatory duties.
Examiners have access to the complete loan
files for both approved and rejected credit ap-
plications and consequently are able to look at
the financial information missing from the HMDA
data. In the past, applicant profiles were con-
staicted for a sample of white and minority ap-
plicants (both acceptances and rejections). No
formal statistical test was conducted, but the
examiner looked for evidence that applicants
are treated according to the articulated lending
criteria of the institution. Financial institutions
are required to maintain such criteria, and in-
spection of them is part of the exam process.
Currently, the Federal Reserve is implement-
ing a testing procedure that estimates a logit
model using the HMDA data for an institution
over roughly the previous three years. If the
race variable is found to be significant, then a
random sample of loan files is selected and the
model is reestimated after adding pertinent
non-HMDA variables, such as employment and
credit histories, net worth, and amount of
other debt obtained from the loan application.
If the race variable continues to be significant,
the examiners pull the loan applications that
the estimated model predicts were influenced
by bias and seek out the bank's management
for an explanation.
The sample size of applications actually ex-
amined, however, is constrained by the time
(and number) of examiners that the agency is
able to devote to the procedure. Fed guide-
lines suggest constructing a matched sample of
• 3 Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1993) cite results from an ex-
tremely large regression on the national HMDA data set, controlling for
institutional and neighborhood characteristics and available individual in-
formation, and find a 7 to 10 percent unexplained differential linked to race.
Munnell et al. (1992) explore the importance of the missing financial in-
formation in evaluating lending decisions in the Boston metropolitan sta-
tistical area. They find that differences in financial characteristics explain
9.9 percentage points of the observed 17.8 percentage-point discrepancy
in denial rates of whites and minorities. The remaining 7.9 percentage
points are considered to be linked to race. A discussion of a number of
systematic problems present in HMDA data can be found in Home (1994).
• 4 See Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1993).
100 white and 100 minority applications. Con-
strained regulatory resources thus potentially
undermine the effectiveness of a consumer
exam in uncovering bias. Clearly, two impor-
tant questions are whether pretests employing
the HMDA data (which are relatively costless
to the examiners, but not to the lenders) pro-
vide useful information, and how large a sam-
ple is required to determine whether lending
bias exists. After developing a simulation
model that allows us to vary the amount of
bias against minorities, we use it to see how
well various testing procedures can identify an
institution that discriminates.
II. Simulation Model
Before going into the details of our simulation
method, a brief overview is useful to highlight
the key parts of the Monte Carlo process.
Throughout the discussion of the model and
consequently of our findings, it must be re-
membered that this is a simulation model and
thus cannot answer the question of whether
lending institutions are really subject to bias.
Our goal is to explore how well various tests
for bias perform when the level of bias is
known beforehand. To accomplish this task, it
is not necessary to mimic the underlying real-
world process precisely. The key qualitative
characteristics we wish to simulate are 1) that
lenders base their mortgage approval decision
on a larger set of variables than is included in
the HMDA data, 2) that some of these omitted
variables are correlated with race, and 3) that
we can control the degree to which our simu-
lated lender allows race to influence the loan
approval process.
The first step is to generate a pool of loan
applicants to simulate the actual population of
both nonminorities and minorities in terms of
income, net worth, debt payments, and credit
history. Wherever possible, the variables are
calibrated using the results of actual consumer
surveys. These generated applicants then ap-
ply for loans in a credit approval model that is
representative of actual approval processes
used by financial institutions. The credit ap-
proval model allows for the possibility of bias
against minorities, with the level of discrimina-
tion able to be varied from zero (in which case
credit decisions are made solely on the basis
of financial characteristics) to a level that re-
sults in a significantly higher level of rejections
for minority applications. The results from the
credit approval model are a set of loan fileswith applicant information and a 0/1 variable
indicating whether or not the loan was granted.
Although we have tried to benchmark our gen-
erated applicants to nationally reported data,
this was not possible in all cases. Our numerical
results will be sensitive to changes in the appli-
cant generation process, but the qualitative
import of our results will not.
At this point, our simulated examiner extracts
a sample from the set of loan files and tests for
discrimination. Several tests are possible. A
"bank examiner" approach could search for
evidence that whites and minorities with similar
characteristics are treated differently, perhaps
through matching rejected minority applications
with approved white applications. Various lev-
els of sophistication are possible. Alternatively,
an "econometric" approach would estimate an
equation and test for a significant coefficient
on the variable representing race. In either the
"examiner" or "econometric" approach, we will
take repeated draws from the loan-file popula-
tion and measure the proportion of times the
test indicates a positive result for discrimina-
tion. By running the tests on loan files gener-
ated from a discriminatory credit approval
process, we are able to explore the sensitivity
of various tests for discrimination.
Generation of
Applicant Data
The applicant sample is generated with the fol-
lowing characteristics: income, net worth, loan
amount, other debt payments, credit history,
and race. Actual loan applications would con-
tain many more variables, but in our model
these are the only ones the bank considers.
More variables could be incorporated into the
simulation model, but their addition would be
unlikely to alter the basic thrust of our findings.
Where possible, we have initially calibrated the
means and correlations of these variables to
those from consumer financial surveys and
other sources."'
To generate the samples, we first created a
matrix of the variances and covariances of the
financial variables for the white and minority
populations. The covariances of the loan amount
and income (in log form) were identified from
the 1990 national set of HMDA data for both
nonminority and minority populations. We do
not have information on the correlation of loan
amount and the other financial variables, so
we set these to plausible values. The means of
the sample for income and loan amount were
also determined using the HMDA data. We set
the means for other financial variables using in-
formation from the 1989 Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF), a nationally representative
wealth survey.
6 In particular, the mean of net
assets in the sample was established by multi-
plying the mean income in the HMDA data by
the ratio of assets to income in the SCF (for
white and minority populations, respectively).
The variance of assets and the correlation be-
tween assets and income for white and minor-
ity populations were also derived from this
survey. We determined the mean of "other
debt" payments using the ratio of other debt
payments to income.
Our information on credit history for real
loan applicants is limited. We used the an-
swers to the SCF question on the timely loan
and credit card payments to establish the sign
of the correlation between bad credit history
and the other financial variables, and modeled
the tendency to have credit problems as an un-
derlying normal random variable (larger values
of credit history are considered bad) that corre-
lates negatively with income and net worth.
Given the means, variances, and correla-
tions, the applicant sample was generated by
1) multiplying the draws from the log-normal
distribution by the Cholesky decomposition of
the desired covariance matrix, and 2) rescaling
the resulting series to match the desired
means. This procedure ensures that the gener-
ated sample exhibits the desired correlations
across variables. Credit history is rescaled into
a categorical variable as follows: For whites,
about 5 percent will have serious credit prob-
lems, 25 percent minor problems, and 70 per-
cent no credit problems. For minorities, the
corresponding percentages are roughly 7, 31,
and 62, so that by construction they have a
higher incidence of credit problems. These
thresholds are arbitrarily chosen to give minori-
ties more credit history problems in order to
match the qualitative characteristics of real-
world data.
The people surveyed in the SCF do not nec-
essarily represent the population of potential
mortgage applicants, because potential home-
owners tend to be more affluent than the
population as a whole. For our initial set of
• 5 We focus on race in this paper, but a similar approach could be
used to determine the power of tests for lending bias related to sex, age,
and marital status.
• 6 See Kennickell and Shack-Marquez (1992) for further informa-
tion on the SCF.TABLE 1
Sample Means of Generated Population
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variables, however, we found that rejection rates
for both whites and blacks from the credit
model (presented in the next section) were
"too high" in comparison to those found in ac-
tual HMD A data, due in part to the low level
of assets of minority families seen in the SCF.
To adjust for this, we marginally increased the
income and net assets of minority families, and
marginally reduced the loan amount for both
blacks and whites. The resulting generated sam-
ples should be viewed as broadly representa-
tive of the financial characteristics seen in the
actual white and minority population, but as
only partially calibrated due to lack of informa-
tion on the financial characteristics of mortgage
applicants.' Changing the financial characteris-
tics, of course, does affect the probability of
acceptance or rejection, but is unlikely to change
the qualitative characteristics of our results.
The sample means of a draw of 5,000 appli-
cants (half minorities) from our samples are
reported in table 1 .
H Corresponding sample cor-
relations are reported in table 2. Our white appli-
cants (for this draw) have significantly larger
incomes and net worths than do minorities, con-
sistent with SCF data. Correspondingly, average
loan amounts are higher for whites than for
minorities. Our sample was generated so that
positive correlations would be observed between
income, net worth, loan amount, and other debt,
and a negative correlation seen between finan-
• 7 Supplementing the SCF data with information in Munnelletal.
(1992) is one possible strategy for correcting this shortcoming.
• 8 Our reason for oversampling is discussed later.
cial variables and credit history. Again, we
view this generated sample as only partially
(and imprecisely) calibrated, but as reflecting
broad relationships observed in the financial
characteristics of populations in the real world.
Credit Approval
Model
Once our applicant pool is generated, the "forms"
are fed into our credit approval model that deter-
mines whether or not the financial institution
makes the loan. The process is modeled so that
"good" applications are almost always approved,
and "bad" applications are almost always rejected.
Borderline applications are approved or denied
with a probability determined by the number of
problems in the application, and by race in the
case of a discriminatory bank.
We assume that the application is initially for
a 30-year loan at a 10 percent interest rate with
monthly payments and a 20 percent down pay-
ment.
9 The loan amount is initially determined
through the applicant generation model. How-
ever, an applicant is unlikely to apply for a 20
percent down payment loan if he lacks the
necessary assets. We model this down pay-
ment decision process in the following way:
First, if the 20 percent down payment is
greater than the applicant's net worth (plus
two monthly payments), the applicant shifts to
a 10 percent down payment. The loan amount
and monthly payments are recalculated accord-
ingly. Second, if net worth still falls short of
the down payment, the applicant shifts to a
loan with a 5 percent down payment.
1
0 Set-
ting the loan amount and down payment in
this sequential fashion is somewhat arbitrary,
but it allows marginal applicants to apply for
appropriate loans. Imposing a strong positive
correlation between loan amount and net
worth further tends to prevent paupers from
applying for million-dollar mortgages.
Loan applications are scored according to
four standard criteria: 1) the ratio of loan pay-
ment to income, 2) the ratio of total debt pay-
ment to income, 3) the percentage of the down
payment, and 4) credit history. Any of the first
three criteria can result in automatic rejection if
• 9 Varying the interest rate and the term of the loan would introduce
diversionary complications into the simulation model.
• 10 Not addressed in this version of the model is the decision of the
private mortgage insurer for down payments below 20 percent, or the effect
of government insurance programs on loans with 5 percent down payments.
Again, these factors are unlikely to affect the basic thrust of our results.TABLE 2
Sample Correlations of Generated Population






































































it is violated. Each of the criteria also has a
"borderline" gray area (called GRAY1, GRAY2,
GRAY3, and GRAY4, respectively) that results
in a positive probability of rejection. Since the
fourth criterion is a qualitative variable, possi-
bly subject to varying interpretations of its se-
verity, an "autoreject" here means that failing
this criterion, by itself, results in a 50 percent
chance of denial.
1
1 If all four criteria meet ap-
proval, then the application is almost always
automatically accepted. With real loan applica-
tions, several other criteria (such as employ-
ment history and an appraisal) are considered
during the underwriting process, but we focus
on just these four standard criteria in an attempt
to make our model more tractable.
The regions for the four criteria are as follows:
1) Loan payment to income (PMT/Y):
If PMT/Y > 0.40, then reject the application;
if 0.40 > PMT/Y > 0.28, then GRAY1;
if PMT/Y < 0.28, then the application passes
this criterion.
2) Total debt payment to income (TPMT/Y):
If TPMT/Y > 0.48, then reject the application;
if 0.48 > TPMT/Y > 0.36, then GRAY2;
if TPMT/Y < 0.36, then the application
passes this criterion.
3) Net worth (NW):
If down payment + 2 X PMT < net worth,
then reject the application;
if 5 or 10 percent down payment, then
GRAY3;
if 20 percent down payment, then the appli-
cation passes this criterion.
4) Credit history:
If there are major credit problems, then ran-
domly reject the application half the time;
if there are minor credit problems, then
GRAY4;
if there are no credit problems, then the ap-
plication passes this criterion.
These credit rules are motivated by actual
credit processes. The financial ratios of 28 and
36 percent in rules 1 and 2, respectively, mir-
ror actual tests used by financial institutions
and suggested by secondary market purchas-
ers, such as the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation (FNMA).
1
2 Rule 3 checks for the
level of down payment and a minimum net
worth. Rule 4 seeks evidence of major and mi-
nor credit problems.
We allow for gray areas, however, in order
to mimic the judgment that goes into the credit
process for borderline applications. For exam-
ple, the financial ratios suggested by FNMA are
considered guidelines subject to the discretion
of the lender. The down payment requirement
reflects the bank's adjustment for an increased
likelihood of default on low-down-payment
loans. Finally, allowing for major and minor
• 11 An additional consideration is that logit regressions cannot han-
dle an independent variable that is too highly correlated with the depend-
ent variable.
12 See Federal National Mortgage Association (1992), pp. 601-94.TABLE 3
Loan Scoring of Generated Population
(Percent of sample, sample size
of 5,000,50% minority)
White Minority
AUTO APPROVE (Meets all criteria)
BORDERLINE (Violates some criteria)
GRAY1
Payment/income
between 28 and 40 percent
GRAY2
(Payment + other debt)/income
between 36 and 48 percent
GRAY3


































credit problems allows for the distinction be-
tween recent bankruptcies versus a couple of
late payments. Past credit problems may also
be the result of unusual circumstances. The
more GRAY areas that an application hits, how-
ever, the more likely that it will be rejected. In
addition, we include a small probability of re-
jection of "clean" applications with no GRAYs
to reflect some randomness in the decision
process. The probability of approval contin-
gent on the total number of GRAY areas is
modeled as follows:
If TOTAL GRAYs = 0, then 3 percent rejec-
tion rate;
If TOTAL GRAYs = 1, then 20 percent rejec-
tion rate;
If TOTAL GRAYs = 2, then 30 percent rejec-
tion rate;
If TOTAL GRAYs = 3, then 40 percent rejec-
tion rate; and
If TOTAL GRAYs = 4, then 50 percent rejec-
tion rate.
These rates were chosen in order to generate a
plausible number of rejections corresponding
to the severity of credit problems.
We also use this process for borderline ap-
plications to introduce discrimination against
minority applicants. Given this modeling, dis-
crimination occurs because minorities are more
likely than nonminorities to be turned down
for a loan when there are blemishes in their
loan applications. In general, we multiply the
vector of approval probabilities by a bias pa-
rameter (BIAS) to increase the probability of re-
jection of minority applications.
If TOTAL GRAYs = 0, then 1/(1 - BIAS)
percent rejection rate;
If TOTAL GRAYs = 1, then 20/(1 - BIAS)
percent rejection rate;
If TOTAL GRAYs = 2, then 30/(1 - BIAS)
percent rejection rate;
If TOTAL GRAYs = 3, then 40/(1 - BIAS)
percent rejection rate;
If TOTAL GRAYs = 4, then 50/(1 - BIAS)
percent rejection rate.
There are many ways to introduce bias into
the loan approval process. This approach has
the advantage of employing only a single
parameter that can easily be varied from no
bias (BIAS = 0) to the point where no minori-
ties ever receive loans (BIAS = 1).
For example, if the bias parameter is set
to 0.5, then minority applicants with a single
GRAY will be rejected 40 percent of the time,
applicants with two GRAYs will be rejected 60
percent of the time, and applicants with three
or four GRAYs will always be rejected at 80
and 100 percent rates, respectively. We use
this simple model so that we can easily test
(by varying one parameter) the sensitivity of
the results to varying levels of discrimination.
Although more complicated models of dis-
crimination can be used, we believe this model
adequately captures the flavor of a discrimina-
tory process where minority applicants are
less likely to be approved in borderline cases.
1
3
The sample statistics for GRAY1 - GRAY4 for
whites and minorities are shown in table 3 (the
sample includes 2,500 whites and 2,500 minorities).
13 This result is implied by the findings of Munnell et al. (1992).TABLE 4
Credit Application Decisions


































































a. If zero, no bias. It one. no loans made to minorities.
SOURCK: Authors' calculations.
The proportion automatically rejected is also
shown along with the four reasons for rejection,
AUTOR1 - ALTOR4. (Applicants may have multi-
ple reasons for automatic rejection.) By construc-
tion, whites are more likely than minorities to
have clean applications that are automatically ap-
proved and are less likely to be automatically re-
jected. In our model, the most common GRAY
areas hit are the credit history rule for both races
and the down payment aile for minorities. Forty
percent of the loans to minorities are for down
payments below 20 percent, and of these, 15 per-
cent are still automatically rejected for not having
the necessary net worth for a mortgage with a 5
percent down payment. In addition, 13 percent
are rejected for a high ratio of total debt to in-
come. For whites, this financial ratio is also the
most common reason for automatic rejection (14
percent).
Approval rates for varying levels of bias are
shown in table 4. Whites are approved about
76.1 percent of the time in our model. With no
discrimination, the minority approval rate is
66.4 percent, a difference of 9.7 percent. This
compares with a national approval rate of 75.5
percent for whites and 55.7 percent for minori-
ties (a 19-8 percentage-point difference) ob-
served in 1990 national HMDA statistics. In our
model, this difference is due solely to the finan-
cial characteristics of the applicant, and it is
also close to that attributed to financial charac-
teristics in Munnell et al. (1992). By varying
our BIAS parameter, however, we can gener-
ate approval rates for minorities that mimic the
observed approval rates in the HMDA data.
A small level of bias (0.2) results in only a
slight increase in the disparity between whites
and minorities. The next level of bias reported
(0.4) raises the disparity to 18.1 percentage
points, close to the observed 19.8 percentage-
point difference in the national statistics. Rais-
ing the level of bias to 0.8 results in a rejection
rate for minorities that is almost three times
that of whites. Thus, our credit approval/
discrimination model can generate the range
of credit approvals observed in the HMDA
data, allows for easy variation of the level of
discrimination, and generates loan files that
can be used to test for discrimination through
a bank examination.TABLE 5
Proportion Passing Examination
(1,000 repetitions, logit test)






















































































































































































In this section, we test the statistical power of
econometric exam tools through Monte Carlo
simulation. We vary both the sample size and
level of bias to test the sensitivity of the exams to
these factors. Repeated draws (of our preset sam-
ple size) from bank loan files (with our preset
level of bias) are used in a logit regression. The
dependent variable is a 0/1 variable indicating
credit approval. Independent variables include
those corresponding to the credit approval proc-
ess: income, net worth, payment/income, total
debt payments/income, down payment/net
worth, CREDIT1 (0/1 dummy for minor credit
problems), and CREDIT2 (0/1 dummy for ma-
jor credit problems). In addition, a 0/1 dummy
variable indicating a minority is included. A sig-
nificant (negative) estimated coefficient is taken
as a positive test for discrimination.
Logit is the preferred estimator on theoreti-
cal grounds for such a model because it allows
for the 0/1 nature of the dependent variable
(determining whether the loan was approved)
and for slightly more outliers than the Probit
model.
1
4 These advantages have also led to its
use in the Boston Fed study and in the current
Federal Reserve testing procedure for investigat-
ing possible lending bias. We conducted 1.000
repetitions for each setting of the model, over-
sampling minorities so that they compose 50 per-
cent of the sample.
1"
1
Table 5 reports the proportion of examina-
tions that "passed" (failed to find statistically
significant evidence of discrimination) at the
standard 5 percent significance level. Figure 1
plots the same data, but is useful for illustrating
how the performance of the test improves as
the sample size increases. In the first column,
there is no bias, yet some banks fail to pass.
The level of "false positives" is an important
factor in evaluating the usefulness of a test.
False positives represent the risk of erroneously
accusing a bank of discriminating when it in
fact does not. An ideal test would always find
bias when it is present, but would never find it
when it is absent. For logit, this rate is typically
in the 1 to 3 percent range over the sample
sizes studied and tends to be slightly better
than the 5 percent we allowed for in our selec-
tion of the significance level.
In the second column, we set our bias
parameter to 0.2, introducing a low-level bias
that, as seen in table 4, increases the rejection
rate for minorities only slightly. For small sam-
ple sizes, we rarely find evidence of this dis-
crimination. Even for a sample size of 800, our
tests successfully uncover discrimination only
15 percent of the time. A small level of dis-
crimination can go undetected by statistical
methods even with very large samples.
• 14 We know that banks do not use an equation like this to make
their decisions, but we use it in our model to approximate their decision-
making process.
• 15 In earlier work, we explored the importance of ovarsampling
We found that it increases the statistical power of the exam by a very
small amount, but reduces the incidence of false positives in small sam-
ple sizes. Oversampling also avoids anomalous results in small sample
sizes, such as having no minority acceptances.FIGURE 1















At moderate levels of discrimination (with bias
equal to 0.4, raising the lending differential be-
tween whites and minorities significantly, as seen
in table 4), sample size plays a critical role in the
power of the exam. We find discrimination less
than 15 percent of the time for sample sizes of
100 or less. Raising the sample size from 100 to
200 increases the power of the exam to about 23
percent, and a sample size of 800 results in a sta-
tistical power of 66 percent.
At larger levels of bias, the logit test is better
able to detect discrimination. For a bias of 0.6,
a sample of 50 uncovered discrimination less
than 15 percent of the time, but the power
increases sharply with sample size. For a sam-
ple of 200, the power is nearly 67 percent; for
a sample of 400, the power is 94 percent. For
our highest level of bias, our smallest sample
size found discrimination 45 percent of the
time, and samples over 250 uncovered discrimi-
nation every time.
Employing only the variables available in the
HMDA data significantly lowered the chance
of passing the examination (see bottom of table
5 and figure 2). One criticism of a test using
this incomplete data is that it suffers from omit-
ted variable bias. In our model, differences in
credit history and assets result in a higher rejec-
tion rate for minorities, but the regression re-
sults attribute this to race even in the absence
of discrimination. While this tends to make it
easier to find bias when it exists, it also makes
it easier to find bias when it does not exist. In
the case of no bias, the power of the test plum-
mets as the sample size increases, so that with
sample sizes of 800, nondiscriminatory banks
would pass less than a third of the time.
Given that one perceived advantage of using
the available HMDA data is that large samples
can be put together at low cost, this result sug-
gests that indications of discrimination that rely
solely on HMDA data should be treated with cau-
tion. The usefulness of employing the readily
available HMDA data to pretest banks in order to
direct scarce regulatory resources more effectively
is a possible extension of our analysis.
Of course, the problem of false positives
arises partly because of the built-in correlations
between race and the other variables. If race
and these variables were uncorrelated, the
problem of false positives would be reduced.
The degree of correlation between the two is
an empirical question.
Initially, we ran ordinary least squares
(OLS) instead of the more sophisticated logit
model to save time in our simulations. While
crude because it fails to adjust for the 0/1 na-
ture of the dependent variable, the OLS test
performs nearly as well as the logit estimator
(see table 6). It also never fails to achieve con-
vergence as the logit sometimes does with
small sample sizes and a high degree of bias.
Consequently, the OLS test using the HMDA
data may be useful as a pretest when logit fails.TABLE 6
Proportion Passing Examination
(1,000 repetitions, OLS test)



















































































































































































A goal of this research is to test the power of ac-
tual examination techniques used in consumer
exam settings. The Federal Reserve System Con-
sumer Compliance Handbook, published by
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1989),
provides guidance on how to model a con-
sumer exam. In addition, we have met with
consumer examiners and one of us went on
an actual consumer examination to observe
procedures firsthand.
Applicant profile worksheets are the main
tool used by consumer examiners to test for
discrimination against protected classes such as
minorities or females. Examiners complete
these forms from a sample of both accepted
and rejected loan files. They list the applicant's
class characteristics along with his or her
length of employment, length of residence,
and monthly debt/income ratio. The forms
also include the date and terms of the re-
quested credit. If the application is rejected,
reasons for rejection are noted.
The examiner then uses the profiles to com-
pare the characteristics of applicants who re-
ceive credit with those who do not, and to
make comparisons between protected classes.
As a first check, the examiner sees whether
those who are accepted or rejected are treated
in accordance with the bank's articulated lend-
ing criteria. Any instances of credit decisions
that fall outside the criteria are flagged for fur-
ther investigation. The examiner then has con-
siderable flexibility in how the files are selected
and segregated for analysis between protected
classes. Various comparisons suggested by the
handbook include accepted minority versus ac-
cepted nonminority, rejected minority versus
accepted nonminority, and rejected minority
versus rejected nonminority. While not con-
ducting a formal statistical test, the examiner
then makes a judgment as to whether the
classes have received equal treatment. With re-
spect to sample size, the Consumer Compliance
Handbook notes:
Since statistical validity is not a key issue, the
ideal size of the judgmental sample cannot be
stated in terms of numbers. Enough items should
be selected in order to draw a reasonable conclu-
sion. Again, the examiner should exercise careful
discretion based upon experience and related ex-
amination findings, (p. 1.B.25)
Discussion with experienced examiners sug-
gests that the examiner starts off with a fairly
small sample size of perhaps 40 acceptances and
40 rejections. This small sample size is due in
part to the limited amount of time available to
conduct the examination. In addition, for many
other of the regulations tested on an examination
— such as truth in lending — compliance can be
adequately ascertained through a small sample.
If the examiner finds any evidence of discrimina-
tion — for example, a rejected minority whose
characteristics dominated those of an accepted
white — then the sample size is expanded and a
more intensive investigation is conducted.TABLE 7
Proportion Passing Examination
(1,000 repetitions, NP I)

















































































































































































As an approximation of actual exam proce-
dures, we tested the power of two potential
exam procedures on our generated loan files.
Our first test (NP 0) looked for any instance of
a rejected minority with financial characteristics
that dominated those of an accepted white.
Domination was defined as having more favor-
able characteristics for all four of the criteria used
in the loan scoring procedures. The second test
(NP I) compared the proportion of minority rejec-
tions that dominated white acceptances with the
proportion of minority acceptances that domi-
nated white rejections. A third test attempted to
see whether differences in the latter proportions
are statistically significant.
NP 0 proved to create a high degree of false
positives. With BIAS set equal to zero and a sam-
ple size of 50, the exam indicated discrimination
39 percent of the time (with 100 repetitions). For
a sample size of 100, discrimination was found
72 percent of the time. Finally, for sample sizes
above 200, we almost always found an instance
of a minority rejected applicant who had more fa-
vorable financial characteristics than an accepted
white. This high degree of false positives sug-
gests that the test was overly stringent given the
degree of randomness we introduced in the loan
files. Whenever there is even a small amount of
randomness in the approval process, the prob-
ability of finding a rejected minority applicant
who dominated an approved white applicant ap-
proaches one, so this test actually performs
worse as the sample size expands in the case
where there is no bias. On the other hand, if
there is no randomness and all of the variables
are measured without error, then this test would
perfonn flawlessly. These are conditions that are
unlikely to be met with actual data.
We used NP I to account for the underlying
uncertainty in the credit approval process. We
compared the proportion of minority rejections
that were dominated by white acceptances
with the proportion of white rejections that
were dominated by minority acceptances. If
the first proportion was larger, we took this as
a flag for discrimination. The power of this
exam is shown in table 7 for sample sizes of
50 through 800.
For BIAS set equal to 0, we find that this
test reports a large proportion of false posi-
tives, better than NP 0, but much worse than
the logit and OLS tests. Using only the HMDA
variables resulted in false positives almost all
of the time regardless of the sample size. When
bias is introduced, this test outperforms logit
and OLS in small samples, but not in large sam-
ples. Unfortunately, the large proportion of
false positives in the case of no bias makes
this test less than ideal.
In table 8, we report results for a modified
version of this test (NP II) that attempts to de-
termine whether differences between the pro-
portion of minority rejections that dominated
some whites and white rejections that were
dominated by some minorities was statistically
significant using a chi-squared test. When there
is no bias, this test has fewer false positives in
small sample sizes than NP I, but has more
when the sample size is large. Like NP I, when
there is bias, the test is much better at detect-
ing it than are logit and OLS in small samples,
but the test is not as good with large samples.TABLE
Proportion Passing Examination
(1,000 repetitions, NFiij













































































































































































a. If zero, no bias. If one. no loans made to minorities.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
V. Conclusion
Using a simulation model, we have examined
several approaches to testing whether a finan-
cial institution discriminates. Because we em-
ploy a simulation model, the degree of bias
can be varied from no bias to the point where
no minorities are given loans.
Tests that employ all of the information in-
cluded in our simulated loan files perform
much better than those that use only the
HMDA subset of data. For example, using the
logit test, a nondiscriminating bank with 800
applications has less chance of passing than a
smaller discriminating bank (bias = 0.4) with
only 250 applications (see table 5). More sur-
prisingly, low levels of bias can be difficult to
detect even with large sample sizes. With lev-
els of apparent bias found in actual HMDA
data, sample size is very important. Tests with
sample sizes under 50 almost always fail to de-
tect bias, whereas tests with sample sizes
greater than 200 perform well. Our test that at-
tempts to mimic the procedures employed by
examiners suggests that they work well in
small samples, but also tend to find bias even
in simulations when it is not present.
The qualitative characteristics of these find-
ings are unlikely to be affected by either better
calibration of the data or more elaborate mod-
eling of the approval process. Detecting bias,
particularly a small degree of bias at an institu-
tion, is likely to be a difficult endeavor. Even
examiners, who have access to the applicants'
loan files, are apt to face problems. Statistical
methods require large sample sizes for low
bias levels, which may require a great deal of
regulatory resources. Examiner-inspired meth-
ods work well in small samples, but have a ten-
dency to find bias even when it is not present.
In particular, any randomness in lending deci-
sions makes simple match-pair tests (such as
NP 0) yield a high degree of false positives.
More sophisticated versions (such as NP I and
NP II) perform better because they allow for
some underlying randomness.
Future research will look at the usefulness
of employing the HMDA variables as a pretest
to direct regulatory resources. By construction,
this paper cannot say whether there is discrimi-
nation in mortgage lending, but by laying out
the issues and problems involved in testing for
discrimination and by exploring the robustness
of the various approaches to testing for bias, it
allows a more informed debate to proceed.References
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